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Special Topic 1: The A-bomb and Medical History
Nuclear Minds: Japanese Psychiatry’s encounter with 
the Atom
Ran ZwigEnbErg
Abstract: From 1945 on, only a handful of  Japanese researchers tackled the psychological conse-
quences of  the atomic bombings of  Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The failure of  the medical establish-
ment to tackle psychological issues was to a large extent, at least initially, the result of  American 
pressure and censorship, and the general secrecy that surrounded nuclear issues during the Cold War 
era.  Coupled with Japanese psychiatrists’ suspicion of  trauma, this resulted in a complete lack of  
psychiatric care for survivors (hibakusha).  Even after the occupation ended, Japanese psychiatrists 
mounted no campaign to fight for their patients’ rights and conducted no large-scale research until 
the 1990s.  Japanese psychiatry’s reluctance to examine the trauma of  the A-bomb, this paper argues, 
was the result of  both long-standing aversion to war-related injuries and postwar entanglement with 
American research.  Focusing on the work of  Hiroshima- and Nagasaki-based doctors this paper will 
examine early psychiatric research on hibakusha and the factors that led to the long-term denial of  care 
for survivors.
Keywords: Hibakusha, psychiatric care, objectivity, A-bomb neurosis, censorship
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1. Introduction: the A-bomb and human psych
In February 1946, the New York Times reported from Hiroshima that “[medical] officers 
of  the twenty fourth division now turning over the garrison to arriving British empire troops 
[discussed] whether the inhabitants of  this city have also undergone freakish psychological 
effects differentiating them other Japanese.”1  This was not a subject of  mere curiosity by the 
departing troops.  In 1945–1946 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) have 
conducted extensive surveys to determine the bomb’s psychological impact and the way it 
affected moral.  This research was only the beginning of  efforts by psychiatrists, as well 
as the wider social sciences to tackle the complex ways in which our minds were affected 
by the advent of  the nuclear age.  Such efforts, which I examined elsewhere, ranged from 
debates over the problem of  human aggression to research into the trauma, panic, anxiety 
and other psychological impacts of  the bomb.  In the US, such research was in line with both 
American military psychiatry interest in dealing with battlefield psychological trauma, and 
the early understanding of  the A-bomb as largely a psychological weapon of  “mass terror.”2 
American psychiatrists, who worked on the subject with nuclear and civil defense research 
bodies, sought to use Hiroshima and Nagasaki research to demonstrate the ability of  civil 
defense medical personal to deal adequately with psychological trauma and keep morale 
high.  USSBS findings were central to a new domestic civil defense effort in the US to teach 
Americans how to deal with a possible nuclear attack.  This was done in the context of  the 
larger efforts by psychiatrists and psychologists to harness the categories of  psychological 
science in the service of  society, or as the first head of  World Health Organization, George 
Chisholm, put it, “healing a sick world.”3
In Japan no such body of  research was allowed to develop, with very little discussion of  
nuclear anxiety, civil defense, or even the medical consequences of  the bomb permitted under 
the occupation.  American censorship authorities in Japan actively suppressed research on 
and discussion of  the possible impact of  nuclear warfare.4  The American Atomic Bomb 
Casualty Commission (ABCC), which was established in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a 
permanent research facility to ascertain the A-bomb’s medical effects, the US military and 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were quite resistant to admitting any long-term damage, 
physical or otherwise.  This lack of  research, tragically, also included Japanese psychiatrists, 
who were not sympathetic to the idea of  long-term trauma.  Consequentially, within this 
 1 New York Times, 26 February, 1946.
 2 Ran Zwigenberg, “Healing a Sick World: Psychiatric Medicine and the Atomic Age,” Medical 
History, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2018), pp. 27–49.
 3 Ibid., p. 28.
 4 Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan, (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991) especially chapter 2.
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growing body of  research, there existed a peculiar yet telling gap, the actual victims of  the 
bomb, the survivors of  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were hardly studied by Japanese, American 
or any other group of  researchers.  Following the initial USSBS research, only a handful of  
researchers worked on the long-term psychological impact of  the bomb on survivors.  It was 
not until the mid-sixties, with the work of  Robert J. Lifton, that the first large scale research 
on survivors was conducted.  Even then, it took another three decades, following the Kobe 
earthquake, that PTSD was introduced into Japan.5
As a result, hibakusha (A-bomb survivors) faced a dismal lack of  care and understanding 
of  the multiple psychological effects caused by their experience in August 1945.  This paper 
aims at explaining this particular lacuna by focusing on the work of  Japanese psychologists 
and psychiatrists in Hiroshima and Nagasaki within the context of  the longer trajectory of  
PTSD and Trauma in Japan.  The lack of  research on A-bomb survivors’ trauma, I argue, 
was the result of  a confluence of  developments, the most of  important of  which were an 
American campaign of  censorship and neglect of  the A-bomb’s long-term effects, Japanese 
researchers suspicion of  trauma and its victims, and the very complex links between radia-
tion damage, then yet unknown, and psychiatric effects.  These factors combined to make 
research difficult and led to five decades of  denial of  care for hibakusha’s mental suffer-
ing, even as their cause was celebrated by the Japanese public and they became subjects of  
intense radiation research in both countries.
2. Japanese attitudes to Trauma: a brief  survey of pre and post 1945 attitudes
Japanese psychiatry’s record in dealing with trauma in general – and the A-bomb in 
particular – was minimal and psychiatrists were not sympathetic to the idea of  long-term 
trauma.6  The first to encounter and write about trauma in Japan were doctors who dealt with 
military casualties.  The Japanese military reliance on its superior “spirit” made it hard to 
accept psychiatric suffering.7  Military psychiatry was generally neglected and doctors rarely 
acknowledged psychological injuries.8  In 1937, for instance, military psychiatrist Kamata 
Shirabe9 told doctors, “Unlike the Western militaries during the First World War, there has 
 5 Ran Zwigenberg, Hiroshima: The Origins of  Global Memory Culture, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 171–72.
 6 Ibid., p. 147.
 7 Janice Matsumura “State Propaganda and Mental Disorders: The Issue of  Psychiatric Casualties 
among Japanese Soldiers during the Asia-Pacific War,” Bulletin of  the History of  Medicine, Vol. 78, 
No. 4 (Winter 2004), p. 808.
 8 Nakamura Eri, ‘Nihon teikoku rikugun to “sensōshinkeibyō: senshōbyōsha o meguru shakai kūkan 
ni okeru ‘kokoro no kaze,’” Sensō sekinin kenkyu, Vol. 81, (2013), pp. 52–61.




been no neurotic illness called war neurosis in the Japanese military since the present war 
[the Asia-Pacific War] broke out.  I’m proud as a member of  the military of  the Emperor that 
the fact shows people of  the Japanese Empire have especially high morale.”10
Japanese casualties were significant, but without a proper accounting and treatment sys-
tem (there was only one dedicated psychiatric hospital) there is really no way of  determining 
how widespread was the phenomenon.  Doctors stressed their roles in preventing psychiatric 
casualties from influencing the fighting spirit of  other troops.  As with German doctors, 
who, during WW I,  initially dissmissed combat trauma as hysteria, Japanese military doctors 
tended to downplay symptoms and tried to return shell-shocked soldiers to their units as far 
as possible.11  This was no coincidence, as Japanese psychiatry was heavily influenced by 
Germany.12  The German psychiatric establishment was, as Paul Lerner and others showed, 
quite allergic to trauma.  After WW I psychiatrists dismissed trauma as a category for receiv-
ing pension and categorized soldiers as having a “pension neurosis.”13  Japanese doctors used 
the exact same language as German doctors to dismiss traumatized soldiers’ claims for com-
pensation.  Soldiers who claimed to be mentally hurt during their service suffered from a 
“compensation neurosis” (hoshō shinkeishō).14
Civilian doctors after the war had no such inhabitations but, again – following the 
German tradition, they generally preferred physical and somatic evidence to mental evidence 
and were generally hostile to trauma.  Only one long term study was conducted on military 
veterans and none was done on civilian victims of  the fire-bombing raids.15  Thus, it is not 
surprising that psychiatric research on survivors’ mental injuries was sporadic and not part 
of  a consistent research effort.  Significantly, the situation in which doctors were operating 
(or rather not operating) was not conducive to research.  This was the result of  a number of  
factors.  First, severe censorship in the early years after the war curtailed any research related 
to the bomb.  Second, cultural stereotypes and social taboos prevented many survivors from 
seeking help or even openly taking about their suffering.  Third, as noted above, Japanese 
 10 Eri Nakamura, ‘“Invisible” War Trauma in Japan: Medicine, Society and Military Psychiatric 
Casualties,’ Historia Scientiarium, Vol. 25., No. 2, (2016), p. 144.
 11 Matsumura “State Propaganda,” p. 807. For Germany see: Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, 
Psychiatry, and the Politics of  Trauma in Germany, 1890–1930. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003).
 12 See George Blowers, “Freud’s Deshi: the Coming of  Psychoanalysis to Japan” Journal of  the 
History of  the Behavioral Sciences, 33 (2) (2001), pp. 115–126.
 13 Christian Pross, Paying for the Past; the Struggle for Reparations for Victims of  Nazi Terror, 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 93.
 14 Matsumura, “State Propaganda,” p. 828.
 15 See Katō Masaaki, Noiroza shinkeishō to wa nani ka, Tokyo, 1955. See also Suzuki Akihito’s sum-




psychiatry, which was heavily influenced by German psychiatric culture, was traditionally 
hostile to trauma.  Fourth, the peculiar nature of  radiation and its unknown character made 
it hard to distinguish between physical and mental affects.  Fifth, and as a result of  the above, 
no reparation schemes were set for mental injuries, hence there was no institutional incentive 
to evaluate survivors.
3. Somatic Approaches and Their Limitations
Immediately after the bombing the Japanese military sent a medical and scientific dele-
gation to the two cities, which included two psychiatrists sent by Tokyo Imperial University’s 
Uchimura Yūshi, one of  the founders of  Japanese psychiatry.  The two young researchers, 
Okada Key and Shimizano Yasuo, were sent to perform autopsies and collect samples of  
brains, for the purpose of  ascertaining radiation damage, rather than questioning survivors. 
The somatic approach was typical of  researchers at the time.  Furthermore, Uchimura, who 
also went to Hiroshima himself, was quite dismissive of  trauma.  Though he experienced the 
fire-bombing personally, he admitted only “some anxiety for my family,” and was actually 
“thrilled by the danger of  bombings.”16  Uchimura, “expected that numbness and despair 
would last only a short time.”17  He, “have heard that refugees from bombed out London 
had suffer from emotional paralysis and depersonalization,” but, like his military colleagues, 
expected Japanese to react differently.18
According to his memoir, Uchimura’s research notes were confiscated by the Americans 
and not much seem to come out of  this initial foray into Hiroshima.19  It is safe to assume that 
even if  doctors were interested in conducting research, American censorship and the harsh 
conditions of  the early occupation would have made such projects difficult to execute.  It took 
a full four years for Japanese research to begin in earnest.  Starting with the first surveys 
that were done in 1949 in Kyushu University by Okumura Nikichi and Hitsuda Heizaburō, a 
small number of  researchers separately examined hibakusha’s persistent health problems. 
But their research was not followed on by many others.20  Connections between researchers, 
let alone a concentrated campaign for hibakusha, never materialized.  Psychiatrists found it 
very hard to directly link the experience of  mass death and psychological trauma.  This was 
mostly because the patients’ syndromes were related to general bad health, physical trauma, 
and radiation rather than to psychological injuries.  A plausible causative link between symp-
 16 Yushi Uchimura, Waga ayumishi seishin igaku no michi (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1968), p. 251.
 17 Ibid., p. 252.
 18 Ibid., p. 251.
 19 Ibid.
 20 Okumura Nikichi and Hitsuda Heizabur. “genbakudan hisai kanja seishinkei byōgakuteki chōsa 
seisek,” Kyushu shinkeiseishin igaku Vol. 1 No. 50 (1949), pp. 50–52.
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toms and trauma was very hard to prove scientifically.
It was hard for researchers to isolate the psychological effects of  the bomb from the 
effects of  radiation – a still unknown phenomenon.21  Many articles by psychiatrists and 
psychologist lament the lack of  research on the matter.  In 1956, Yuzuki Takeshi observed, 
“ten years after the bomb although there were no surgical or other medical problems hiba-
kusha still complain of  fatigue, memory and other subjective issues.”  But his research as 
well remained on the level of  diagnosis.  Conducting research on both hibakusha and non-
hibakusha group he found that indeed hibakusha, especially laborers, suffered disproportion-
ally more than non-hibakusha but no significant difference was found in urine samples or 
other physical measures.  Yuzuki however offered no explanation to this.22  Starting in 1953, 
Konuma Masuo, in the largest survey of  its time, examined 132 cases of  hibakusha.  He 
found autonomic ataxia (lack of  muscle coordination), dizziness, headaches, sleep disorders, 
amnesia etc.  Konuma noted that that these symptoms are usually the result of  brain injury. 
However, he could detect no such injury.  Konuma concluded that these were in “high prob-
ably because of  changes in the brain and nervous system which were caused by radiation 
damage.”23  There is no explanation why these are attributed to radiation rather than other 
factors.  Yet, given how little was known about radiation, and how closely guarded much of  
its information was, it is not surprising that cognitive issues as well were also regarded as 
a result of  radiation damage.  Konuma, significantly, was one of  the only researchers that 
worked on long term issues, such as A-bomb fatigue (known as bura bura byo) and made 
connections between military and hibakusha research.  But Konuma worked mostly alone 
and his impact was limited.
4. Kubo Yoshitoshi: Toward a Psychology of Hibakusha Suffering and the Ideal 
of  World Peace
The narrow scope of  Konuma’s and others’ research continued well beyond the occu-
pation.  Japanese “self-censorship,” and dependence on government funding added to the 
silence on the matter well into the 1960s.  As Osaka Eiko demonstrated the occupation also 
heralded a shift in Japanese psychology towards American methodologies.24  This shift con-
tinued after the occupation as Japanese researchers tried to integrate themselves into the 
 21 Ibid. p. 153.
 22 Yuzuki Takeshi, “genbaku hibakusha no jikakuteki hirōshōjō chōsa narabi ni nyū do hannō ni yoru 
hirō chōsa sesaki ni tuite,” Hiroshima igaku, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1956), pp. 78–80.
 23 Nishimoto Minae and Matsumoto Kazuo, “Saigai no shinshin hoken gakuteki kenkyū: hanshin 
daishinsai 6 nen ato ni okeru [Research on Preserving the Health of  Mind and Body after Disasters: 
A Report 6 Years after the Great Hanshin Earthquake],” Jinbun ronkyū, 52, 3 (2002), 66.
 24 Osaka Eiko, ‘Senryō Nihon shinrigaku,’ Surugadai Daigaku kyuyō kenkyūsho, Vol. 1 (2011), p. 181.
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American dominated Cold War world of  postwar research.25  The occupation used a number 
of  psychologists in conducting surveys of  Japanese attitudes towards occupational reforms. 
Kubo Yoshitoshi, a Hiroshima native and former Imperial Navy doctor, was one of  these psy-
chologists.26  Kubo’s work on hibakusha represents one of  the only sustained efforts to tackle 
the psychological impact of  the bomb.  Kubo was the only one among Japanese researchers 
who stuck to psychological explanations and did not connect damage to radiation or other 
aspects of  hibakusha health.  Significantly Kubo was concentrating, like his American col-
leagues who worked on civil defense issues, on the issue of  panic and individual and mass 
nervous breakdown.27  Kubo divided survivors’ reactions into five stages in which they went 
from “instinctive action,” to “panic,” “quasi panic” and a “blank” (stupefied) stage.  None of  
these stages, however, lasted beyond a week or two after the bomb.28  Kubo’s work completely 
neglected any impact beyond these two weeks and curiously stopped with the day of  the 
bomb.  Even though he was writing in 1952, seven years after the bomb, Kubo asserted, “We 
can hardly estimate the next stage,” concluded Kubo, “but perhaps some time after, every 
respondent succeeded in slowly adjusting to their circumstances.”29  Kubo’s emphasis in later 
research was, likewise, on short term impact of  the bomb and his work tend to stress more 
and more the political aspect of  his work, in relation to promotion of  peace, rather than its 
medical aspects.30
Politics, however, were driving greater and greater interest in the hibakusha’s plight. 
1956, the year where awareness to the plight of  hibakusha peaked – following the establish-
ment of  hidankyo, saw a number of  other studies.  That year a medical survey by a hibaku-
sha organization found 7.3 percent of  hibakusha suffering from nervous disorder, and an 
“overwhelming number of  people who suffered from neurasthenia.”  The survey prompted 
at least two different research schemes.31  One of  these groups, led by Kondō Toshiyuki and 
Yoshioka Ichirō did research in Hiroshima and concluded that hibakusha indeed have higher 
rates of  memory problems, excitability and other symptoms than prevalent in general popu-
lation.  Kondō et al. as well did not progress beyond that conclusion.32  But, crucially, neither 
 25 Ibid., 177, 186
 26 Ibid., 177, 186.
 27 Ran Zwigenberg, “Wounds of  the Heart”: Psychiatric Trauma and Denial in Hiroshima,” History 
Workshop Journal, Vol. 84 (Fall 2017), pp. 12–13.
 28 Ibid; Kubo Yoshitoshi, “Hiroshima hibaku chokugo no ningen Hiroshima hibaku choku go no nin-
gen kōdō no kenkyu,” Shinrigaku kenyū, Vol. 22, no. 2 (1951), pp. 103–110.
 29 Ibid., p. 109.
 30 Zwigenberg, “Wounds of  the Heart,” pp. 15–17.
 31 Nishimoto Minae and Matsumoto Kazuo, “Saigai,” p. 66.




the Kondō group nor any of  the other studies examined here cite each other.33  Whatever 
Japanese research on hibakusha they do refer to is from radiation and related studies.  None 
mentioned research done at the time on survivors of  the Nazi camps or other traumatic expe-
riences.
This failure can be partly attributed to hibakusha’s reluctance to come forward.  Also, in 
1956, a survey conducted by hidankyō reported, somewhat cryptically, on many hibakusha 
who “suffer from problems of  the heart, which lead to family problems and a-social behav-
ior.”34  The report did not go beyond this observation.  This was not surprising as the subject 
was taboo at the time.  Many hibakusha did not even raise the issue within the survivor com-
munity, let alone publicly speak of  their mental issues, preferring to complain, like Holocaust 
survivors, of  more “normal” physical ailments instead.35  Significantly, hidankyō did not even 
raise the issue of  treatment for mental damages when it campaigned for a medical law with 
the government.  Reparation from the Americans was, of  course, out of  the question.
One exception to this trend was the aforementioned Kubo Yoshitoshi, who was one of  
the principal backers of  the compensation movement.  Kubo’s motivation for his research 
can be very much tied to his political activity, both with the University Scholars Society 
and the larger, all Japan, “Japanese Psychologists for Peace.”  This organization sought, in 
a similar manner, and inspired by, American social scientists, to further the “link between 
psychoanalysis and peace.”36  Kubo was among the founding members of  the society and 
is signed on a 1950 “peace appeal to American Psychologists,” which was crafted at the 
fourteen-annual conference of  the Japanese Psychological Association.  The peace appeal, 
as well as the peace society as a whole, made a point of  the Japanese psychologists unique 
situation as citizens of   “the country [which] experienced the terrors of  the atomic bombs in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”37  Significantly, however, the society’s and Kubo’s points of  intel-
lectual reference were exclusively American.  In his 1952 paper he cited research, that was 
tied to USSBS and similar Civil defense research, as well as an article on the psychological 
impacts of  Orson Welles’ famous “War of  the Worlds” scare.38  But Kubo, through his politi-
 33 Konuma Toshio et al., “seishin keika no matome,” Nagasaki igaku ka zashi vol. 36 (1961), p. 101.
 34 Gensuibakuikinshi Hiroshima kyōgikai genbaku higaisha kyūen iinkai, “genbaku higaisha  jitai 
chōsa hōkoku,” (Hiroshima, 1956), p. 6.
 35 Author interview with a group of  hibakusha from the HIP (Hiroshima Interpreters for Peace) 
group, 23 January 2012 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, See also Monica Braw, “Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki: The Voluntary Silence,” in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden, Living with the 
Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 157.
 36 Heiwa no Tame no Shinrigakusha Kondankai, Heiwa shinrigaku no ibuki, (Kyoto: Hōsei Shuppan, 
1990), p. 1.
 37 Ibid., p. 2.
 38 Kubo, “Hiroshima hibaku chokugo,” p. 32.
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cal work, together with Nakano Seiichi and others as well as the main survivor relief  orga-
nizations was important in pushing for the publication of  white papers and other reports on 
the state of  hibakusha that were instrumental in bringing about the medical relief  laws for 
the hibaksuha.39
5. Conclusion: the question of  Denial
The question remains, however, why Kubo and other psychologists and psychiatrists did 
not push for inclusion of  mental health provisions in these laws.  There is no easy answer to 
this conundrum.  A number of  possible explanations can be found in the evidence examined 
above.  Japanese psychiatrists and psychologists did not deny hibakusha suffering.  Unlike 
their American counterparts they did not try to downplay it, or as with their colleagues in the 
military, claim that hibakusha are just being lazy and malignant.  Hibakusha suffering was 
definitely acknowledged.  However, for psychiatrists, who preferred physical and organic 
explanations, what caused psychiatric symptoms was in doubt, thus leading to much confu-
sion and little involvement in hibakusha relief.  For Kubo, the explanation was psychological 
(in the “stimuli produced by the bomb”), nevertheless, he was not interested in offering cure 
but in how to prevent the next war and the politics of  the peace movement.
Researchers did report of  many symptoms that together constituted what came to be 
called “A-bomb neurosis,” but time and again they failed to connect disparate research and 
come together with an agreed definition of  the problem or any sort of  methodology to deal 
with it.  Researchers were acutely aware of  the untidy and confusing nature of  their findings 
and struggled to connect and make sense of  it.  In what they did find there was an over-
whelming preference for somatic explanations and aversion to psychological ones.  This was 
perhaps due to the stigma attached to mental issues among both patients and doctors.  We 
must remember that up until 1950 mental patients in Japan were still locked up in cages, and 
that most of  these researchers grew up in a system where racial thinking, which saw mental 
defects as a sign of  racial inferiority, was the norm.  The result of  such shortcomings was, 
tragically, that only in the 1990’s following the Kobe earthquake that thinking about trauma 
started to change in Japan.
 39 Hamatani Masaharu, “Genbaku taiken to ‘kokoro no kizu,’ IPSHU kenkyū hōkoku, no. 41, (2009), 
pp. 5–6.
